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REPORTED EARNINGS AND ANALYST FORECASTS AS COMPETING 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION: A NEW APPROACH  
 
Abstract 
We study information flows between earnings and forecasts, using suitably adapted 
Granger causality tests. This approach complements existing cross-sectional studies by 
abstracting from stock market reactions to information, and focussing on dynamic 
interactions between information flows instead. We find bi-directional causality in time-
series of analyst earnings forecasts and reported earnings, supporting our expectation that 
forecasts contribute to information that is reflected in future reports. Further, our 
evidence of feedback suggests that past reports and forecasts are both reflected in future 
forecasts, implying that the information in reports has inherent value, and that forecasts 
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1.   Introduction 
Over an extended period of time, a typical firm reports its quarterly earnings; then 
analysts forecast the next quarter’s earnings; then the firm reports earnings for that 
quarter; followed by further analyst forecasts …. – we observe an ‘earnings/forecasts’ 
cycle. Our central research question asks: what is the role played by financial analysts in 
informing the market of the performance of a firm via earnings forecasts and what are the 
dynamic interactions between earnings forecasts and firms’ reported earnings in both the 
short-run and the long-run? Although our basic question is not new, the approach that we 
take is novel and the insight this offers is important.  
The accumulated evidence that analysts provide a valuable service to investors, 
typically centres on the market price reactions to firm earnings announcements and 
analysts forecasts (see Frankel, Kothari and Weber, 2006; Lennox and Park, 2006; 
Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Bartov et al., 2002; Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2001; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 
1996). However, it is recognized that the pooled cross-sectional approach and use of 
market reactions to support the information value of various competing sources of 
information (viz. analyst and firm earnings announcements) is dependent on a range of 
methodological choices – for example, the length of the event window used and the fact 
that tests jointly examine market efficiency and the model used.  The interpretation of 
these results is therefore open to debate and subject to a wide variety of interpretations.
1   
                                                 
1Notably, the post-earnings announcement drift evidence has been used to cast doubt on the efficiency with 
which the market responds to earnings news (see Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000; Ball and 
Bartov, 1996; Bhushan, 1994 and Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990). Also, a price drift similar to that 
observed for earnings announcements has been documented for analyst forecast revision announcements 
(see Gleason and Lee, 2003; Elgars, Lo and Pfeiffer, 2001 and Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminanthan, 
1993). Our purpose in highlighting this area is to show that the issue of how earnings related information is 
disseminated and the market’s response to it, is still not fully resolved.   3 
Our paper explicitly models the (joint) dynamic characteristics of forecasts and 
earnings, seeking to establish whether the information contained in analyst forecasts is 
leading, contemporaneous or lagging a firm’s public earnings announcement (‘reported’ 
earnings). We use an adaptation of standard Granger causality tests to achieve this aim.
2 
Our application of this time series econometric procedure provides an alternative 
approach to the techniques that have been used in the extant literature, and offers new 
insights into the literature on the interaction between earnings and forecasts for the 
following reasons. First, our choice of a time-series framework affords us the unique 
opportunity to explore the temporal dimension of the earnings/forecasts interplay. 
Second, our analysis is conducted on a firm by firm basis, and therefore allows for firm 
specific differences in the evolution of earnings and forecasts. Third, we are careful to 
pursue our research objective without reference to stock price reactions. As such, our 
research method has the advantage of removing possible confounding effects that might 
have adversely influenced the conclusions drawn by previous studies:  for example, the 
arbitrary choice of a returns window; the unknown degree of market 
efficiency/inefficiency; or the likely preferential treatment of some clients by analysts 
leading to information leakages. Finally, we differ from the prior literature because our 
focus is not on the short-run value relevance of information, but rather on whether or not 
information from different sources (i.e. from analysts or from reports) actually adds to 
existing information set on earnings.  
  A large body of literature has established the value relevance of earnings forecasts 
(see Frankel, Kothari and Weber, 2006; Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005; Gleason and 
                                                 
2 A standard Granger causality methodology cannot be used because the analysts’ forecasts are irregularly 
spaced and the actual earnings announcements are not always precisely one quarter apart in calendar time. 
In addition, there are many analyst forecasts for each earnings announcement.   4 
Lee, 2003; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). For example, Bartov et 
al., (2002) and Lopez and Rees (2001) have shown that the prices of securities are 
affected by analysts’ forecasts.  That is, firms with positive forecast errors (firms’ actual 
earnings are greater than analysts’ forecasts), on average, tend to experience positive 
stock price adjustments and vice versa.   
In addition, there has been empirical evidence to suggest that the interaction 
between analyst forecasts and firm reported earnings is dynamic and complex. Lennox 
and Park (2006), Hutton (2005), Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) and Matsumoto 
(2002) provide evidence on the  “earnings guidance” to analysts by management.
3  
Specifically, management guide the analysts to certain earnings levels that avoid negative 
earnings surprises and this suggests that while analysts’ revision announcements may pre-
empt “public” earnings announcements, it does not necessarily mean that the analyst 
information is a substitute for earnings information. Earnings reports have intrinsic value 
because they provide an accountability function, a confirmation role, and evidence for (or 
against) careful and responsible management. Building on the earlier work of Skinner 
(1994) and Pownall, Wasley and Waymire (1993), recent studies on voluntary 
management earnings forecasts provide additional motivation for studying the timing, 
relevance and information content of different types of information (see Lennox and 
Park, 2006; Brown and Higgins, 2005). 
                                                 
3Lennox and Park (2006) examine the relationship between a firm’s earnings response coefficient and the 
management’s issuance of earnings forecasts and document a significant positive relationship.  Hutton 
(2005) examines the characteristics of firms that were more likely to provide guidance to analysts. 
Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) specifically examine the role of managerial incentives to sell stock 
and to guide analysts. Finally, Matsumoto (2002) finds evidence that firms guide analysts’ forecasts 
downwards to avoid missing expectations at earnings announcements.   5 
  In the US, there is a body of evidence which suggests that the earnings reporting 
process has lost some of its relevance to investors due to the availability of competing 
information sources (see, for example, Francis, Schipper and Vincent, 2002; Lev and 
Zarowin, 1999; Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 1997).  Notably, analysts are able to 
usefully draw upon non-financial information, taking advantage of the fact that such 
sources are not constrained by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and are 
likely to have greater timeliness when compared to earnings and financial reports.
4   
Another branch of the empirical literature suggests asymmetric stock price 
reactions to falling short of versus beating analysts’ consensus forecasts (Sequeira, Ho 
and Tang, 2007, Skinner and Sloan, 2002 and Lopez and Rees, 2001). While this 
evidence suggests that analysts’ forecasts have significant information content, with 
wealth implications for management and investors, it also implicitly points to the 
relevance of earnings reports, which provide a yardstick for assessing whether forecasters 
have under or over-predicted earnings. 
All of this empirical evidence suggests that the information environment for firms is 
dynamic and that there is a complex mutual inter-dependence between earnings forecasts 
and reported earnings. In this paper, our methodology addresses this interdependence by 
following the forecasts and actual earnings for each firm in chronological order, and 
exploring whether analysts’ forecasts are a timely and accurate source of competing 
information in relation  to reported earnings, and then whether reported earnings feed 
additional information into future forecasts. The fundamental questions that we 
investigate are: (i) are analysts’ earnings forecasts substitutes, complements or simply a 
                                                 
4 For example, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) and Deng, Lev and Narin (1999), use patents citations in 
their studies on predicting stock performance and market valuation, respectively.   6 
repeat of reported earnings; and (ii) is there information in reported earnings that was not 
anticipated in past forecasts, but which contributes to future forecasts?     
Addressing these questions is important since a clear understanding of this process 
is useful at two levels. First, it has implications for regulators who formulate disclosure 
policy. A better understanding of the process of information dissemination in markets 
would help regulators to frame and strengthen disclosure policy for the various market 
participants. Such knowledge will help regulators to frame policies that govern the 
practices of and relationship between analysts vis-à-vis firms for which they provide the 
forecasts.
5 Second,  understanding  the  earnings/forecast linkage enhances investors’ 
ability to assess the value-add of information intermediaries such as analysts to the 
investment decision making process.  
The results of our paper show evidence of bi-directional “causality” i.e. that analyst 
earnings forecasts Granger-cause reported earnings and similarly reported earnings 
Granger-cause earnings forecasts. In other words, analyst earnings forecasts (reported 
earnings) have information content separate from that in past earnings (analysts forecasts) 
that is helpful in predicting reported earnings (analyst earnings forecasts).  Further, past 
earnings and past forecasts both provide information that is incorporated into future 
forecasts. This provides valuable time series evidence (in contrast to prior cross-
sectionally based analysis) that affirms the mutual inter-dependence of earnings forecasts 
                                                 
5  As a recent example of regulators’ interest in this general area, consider the SEC promulgation of 
Regulation FD – Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). Proponents of Reg FD argued that selective disclosure of 
information encourages analysts to provide biased recommendations in order to maintain good relations 
with the firm management in order to remain privy to first hand information.  Thus, Reg FD was created to 
promote full and fair disclosure, such that any new material information released by companies to a select 
group e.g. analysts, must be made fully public.   7 
and reported earnings in a dynamic information network.  The findings are independent 
of the concerns on methodological issues in the previous literature. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
literature review, while Section 3 outlines our data. In Section 4, our methodology on the 
non-standard Granger Causality test is presented. Section 5 outlines and discusses our 
results and Section 6 presents our conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationships between stock prices, earnings forecasts and reported earnings have 
been studied extensively by numerous researchers.  Most of the literature cited in Section 
1 focuses on the short run relationships between stock price reactions to reported earnings 
and analyst forecasts, although it is recognized that there are long run components in 
stock prices, earnings and their associated forecasts.  
Our study builds on the premise of earlier work by Ou and Penman (1989) and 
Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980) which show that the permanent component of prior 
earnings can provide explanatory power in predicting future earnings and stock prices.  
Specifically, Ou and Penman (1989, p. 112) remark that “certain of these numbers 
(numbers presented in the income statement, balance sheet, and the statement of changes 
in financial position) can be summarized into one measure that predicts future earnings 
and also filters out transitory components of current earnings.” (italics added).     8 
Analysts earnings forecasts can be viewed as a sufficient summary statistic
6 that 
incorporate general market information, as well as the numbers in the financial statements 
of the firm, including past reported earnings, to predict the future earnings of the firm.  
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there exists a linkage between past 
earnings, current analyst forecasts and the future reported earnings.  Recent research also 
suggests that management try to influence analyst forecasts, for example, through the 
strategic release of profit warnings and management forecasts (Libby, Tan and Hunton, 
2006; Soffer, Thiagarajan and Walther, 2000).  Our paper launches off the preceding 
arguments to provide evidence on the mutual inter-dependence of the lead, lag or 
contemporaneous relationships between reported earnings and earnings forecasts of a 
firm.
7   
A major contribution of our paper is that it uses a lead-lag structure to model both 
short-run and long-run interactions between reported earnings and earnings forecasts, 
thereby accounting for a permanent component as well as medium and short-run 
interactions. This approach not only presents a formal framework to document the 
interactions between analyst forecasts and reported earnings, independent of stock price 
reactions, it also provides an alternative perspective to the findings reported in previous 
work such as Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld (1992, p.197) which conclude that “analysts 
                                                 
6 The concept of “sufficiency” that we have in mind here is analogous to the normal statistical definition of 
a “sufficient” statistic – that is, a sufficient statistic (analysts forecast) for θ (the reported earnings) captures 
all the relevant information about θ that is in the data (environment). 
7There exists a host of literature on the permanent and transitory earnings components in forecasting 
earnings per share (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Jones, Morton and Schaefer, 2000; Baber, Kang and 
Kumar, 1999; Ali and Zarowin, 1992a, Ali and Zarowin, 1992b; Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld, 1992; Collins 
and Kothari, 1989; Ou and Penman, 1989; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 1980).  
However to keep our research design manageable, we do not attempt to disentangle the permanent and 
transitory components.     9 
correctly use the time-series properties of annual earnings when setting their forecasts of 
annual EPS”. 
 
2.2  Analysts’ role as information providers for earnings determination 
Various researchers such as Francis and Schipper (1999) and Lev and Zarowin (1999) 
have suggested that, over time, financial accounting/ earnings information seems to have 
generally lost relevance. An interesting and potentially valuable alternative source of 
information which can be thought of as a type of ‘amalgam’ filter of all such sources is 
the analyst reports. Many researchers suggest that analyst reports are the main and most 
credible alternative source of competing information to actual earnings reports (see 
Frankel, Kothari and Weber, 2006; Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005). Why? Analysts are 
not hindered by limitations of earnings reports such as timeliness and adherence to 
GAAP. Moreover, analysts are able to capture and process with skill the many and varied 
information signals available, as well as extract other information not readily available in 
the public domain. Does this mean that earnings reports can be “replaced” by analyst 
reports? 
  Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2002) directly examine analyst reports as the 
primary source of competing information and ask whether they reduce the usefulness of 
reported earnings, as measured by the market price reaction to the earnings 
announcement. In their main tests, they examine both mean and aggregate absolute 
abnormal return (AAR) for both analyst reports and earnings announcements related to a   10 
particular financial year.
8  They find that the AAR for analyst reports is positively 
associated with the AAR for the earnings announcements and conclude that this is 
consistent with analyst reports complementing earnings announcements. Furthermore, 
they examine the relationship between current period earnings announcements and the 
subsequent year analyst reports. They find some evidence that earnings reports in the 
current year are positively associated with the market reaction of analyst reports in the 
following year. They conclude that this might be consistent with analyst reports being a 
complementary information source rather than a substitutionary information source to 
earnings announcements.
9   
  Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) examine analysts’ reports and the market reaction 
to the release of the reports. They find that analysts provide new information and interpret 
previously released information.  In addition, they also find that the market reacts to all of 
the elements of the report, namely, earnings forecast revisions, recommendation 
revisions, and price target revisions.  They also conclude that analyst reports play a role 
in interpreting information from other sources.   
Frankel, Kothari and Weber (2006) examine the cross-sectional determinants of the 
informativeness of analysts research by examining the stock price impact of analyst 
reports, controlling for endogeneity among factors that may contribute to the information 
environment.  They find that analysts’ reports are informative, that the information 
                                                 
8According to Francis et al (2002, p. 314), “Aggregate AAR’s are constructed by summing all AARs to all 
analyst reports about firm j disclosed prior to firm j’s earnings announcement. For the mean AARs, it is 
constructed by averaging the aggregate AARs over the number of earnings announcements or the number 
of analyst reports in a given year.”  
9Cheng (2005) concludes, on research in a related area, that while analysts do use information contained in 
financial reports, they do not fully incorporate all this information into their forecasts of future earnings. In 
addition, analysts draw on information beyond that contained in financial reports.   11 
environment affects the informativeness of the reports and that the informativeness of 
analyst research and financial statements are complementary.  
  Another strand of the literature on the relationship between earnings information 
and analyst information is the theoretical work of Kim and Verrecchia (1991, 1994 and 
1997). The main feature of their work is the modelling and predictions of market 
reactions to public announcements. Notably, their models recognize and attempt to 
incorporate the interaction of public and private information. They identify institutions 
such as financial analysts and large stockholders (e.g. fund managers) who are capable of 
acquiring and processing information in such a way that it retains a private/confidential 
nature. In this setting, Kim and Verrecchia model how the quality or precision of the 
forthcoming public announcements affect the incentives and acquisition of private 
information by these institutions. Public announcements of sufficient precision, which 
permit traders to act profitably on the acquired private information, will further reinforce 
the acquisition of private information by these institutions.  
In addition, the Kim and Verrecchia model predicts that as the quality of prior 
information increases or as the cost of information gathering increases, the incentive to 
acquire costly private information will decrease. If we interpret analyst reports as 
revealed private information, their models appear to suggest that as the quality of 
earnings announcements increase, then prior earnings are sufficient signals for future 
earnings. This sufficiency suggests that there is less incentive and a lower need for the 
acquisition of useful private (analyst) information. As such, it may result in analysts 
reports which nevertheless are produced, to simply “repeat” the information contained in 
public earnings announcements. Further, as the (relative) cost of information gathering   12 
decreases (inversely correlated with the size of the firm) and holding all other factors 
constant, their model indicates that analyst reports may become substitutes for earnings 
announcements. 
  Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that more informative corporate disclosures are 
positively related to the number of analyst forecasts and negatively related to analyst 
forecast dispersion. Lang and Lundholm (1996, p. 490) conclude that “disclosures 
increase the demand for analyst reports because they reduce the costs of supplying them”. 
They argue that their evidence might show that analysts are not directly competing with 
the firm’s disclosures and is “consistent with the view that analysts possess both firm-
provided and privately-acquired information” (p. 490). Barron, Byard and Kim (2002) 
also find evidence that the demand for analyst reports increases with the firms’ 
disclosures. They argue that their findings and those of Lang and Lundholm (1996) are 
consistent with the fact that analysts serve as information processors and analyst reports 
are complements to actual earnings reports.   
For many of the above-mentioned papers (and for this literature in general), a major 
unresolved issue is whether the same conclusions are valid if stock market reactions are 
not used as the basis for assessing the link between analyst reports and earnings 
announcements. Accordingly, we provide an alternative empirical approach that delivers 
such evidence – with a special focus on the issue of whether analyst reports are 
substitutes, complements or simply repeats of reported earnings. 
   13 
2.3 Hypotheses 
The main theme from the preceding literature review is that there are many competing, 
complementary or even substitutionary sources of information, about the future earnings 
of firms. Our paper focuses on a particularly important source of such information:   
analyst earnings forecasts.   
Our hypotheses are premised on the idea that analysts’ earnings forecasts will 
(depending on their quality) successfully predict the next round of (scheduled) earnings 
numbers. In turn, we hypothesize that past (scheduled) reported earnings numbers contain 
information that is extremely useful to analysts, thereby having a major impact on the 
forecasts that they make of future earnings. Accordingly, we set up a framework which 
accommodates the possibility of either uni-directional or bi-directional “causality” 
between reported earnings and analyst earnings forecasts. Our hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Analysts forecasts of earnings contain information (additional to that 
contained in past earnings) that is useful for predicting earnings (i.e. 
forecasts Granger “cause” reported earnings) 
H2: Prior reported earnings numbers contain information (additional to that 
contained in past forecasts) that is useful for future forecasts (i.e. 
earnings reports Granger “cause” analyst forecasts) 
  The first hypothesis is tested against the null that earnings forecasts do not Granger 
cause reported earnings, while the second is tested against the null that reported earnings 
do not Granger cause earnings forecasts. For a given firm, if the null is rejected in both 
cases, then we can conclude that there is bi-directional causality, whereas if we fail to 
reject the null in both cases then there is no evidence of causality in either direction. After   14 
conducting formal tests against H1 and H2, we can use the results to classify each firm 
into one of four categories, involving bi-directional causality, uni-directional causality 
(two cases) and no causality. These scenarios are summarized in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
           We stress that the interpretation of (Granger) causality in this context is not literal. 
Rather, it has the interpretation that is common in the forecasting literature, which simply 
means that if X Granger causes Y, then past values of X provide information (over and 
above that contained in past values of Y) that is useful for predicting Y. Causality tests are 
interesting in this context because they condition on a given information set (e.g. past 
earnings) and then ask if other information (e.g. past forecasts) improves the ability to 
predict a target variable (e.g. future earnings). The conditioning on one portion of the 
information set allows the researcher to assess the additional contribution that another 
portion of the information set makes towards the forecast, and this is particularly useful if 
one wants to follow information flows from one variable to another. 
         Our tests seek to examine directly the time series relationship between analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and actual earnings announcements, in addition to simply asking 
whether analysts’ forecasts are a credible and sufficiently accurate source of timely 
competing information to the reported earnings event.  The key innovation in our paper is 
that we assess information flows between earnings and forecasts, using a careful 
adaptation of a widely acclaimed time series approach that does not rely on any 
measurement of stock market consequences. In so doing, we complement and extend the 
cross-sectional methodologies used in prior studies which have examined the information 
dynamics of earnings.   15 
3.   Data and Sampling Issues 
3.1  Basics 
There are alternative/competing sources of public information capable of providing 
insights into the direction and, to a certain extent, the magnitude of current year earnings.  
These sources can be characterized into three broad categories: (a) firm specific; (b) 
industry specific;
10, 11 and (c) country or economy wide. Our direct focus in this paper 
will be on firm specific information and analyst forecasts specific to the firm. Firm 
specific information includes prior period earnings of the firm and voluntary management 
earnings forecasts or guidance.
12  
The typical US firm furnishes an earnings report that relates to each quarter t and 
for each of these reports, we record actual earnings per share (et) and the date (st ) on 
which the earnings report was issued. Analysts' forecasts of earnings per share (fjtτ, for 
analysts j = 1,2,…,Jt ), and the date τ on which analyst j issued the forecast for quarter t 
are also recorded. Both of these are sourced from the I/B/E/S database. The original 
dataset consisted of information relating to 19,983 firms, over the period from January 1, 
1984 to June 30, 2005. In total, there were 1,679,916 forecasts relating to 467,462 
                                                 
10 For industries that are either directly or indirectly impacted by international events, this information set 
can be viewed as incorporating such global information as well. 
11  Foster (1981), Baginski (1987) and Clinch and Sinclair (1987) show that there are intra-industry 
information transfers. Firms that report earlier, provide general information about the earnings of firms in 
the same industry that are yet to report. Clinch and Sinclair (1987) found, that “an earnings announcement 
that results in a positive (negative) change in the announcing firm’s stock price is generally associated with 
a positive (negative) change in the stock prices of other firms in the same industry.” (Clinch and Sinclair, 
1987, p. 90). 
12 Baginski (1987), in his examination of a firm’s management forecasts of earnings, shows that they affect 
the stock price of non-disclosing firms in the same industry. This indicates information transfers occur 
across related firms. Frost (1995) using a number of different tests, produces three notable findings. First, 
she reaffirms the positive association between an announcing firm and other firms in the same industry. 
Second, the larger information content of the earnings disclosure, the larger is the information transfer. 
Third, econometric techniques that account for contemporaneous cross correlations produce less significant 
results. In our paper, we do not seek to directly incorporate these effects but assume that they are 
information components fully captured by and incorporated into analyst forecasts.   16 
quarterly earnings reports, so that on average we had 23.4 quarterly earnings reports for 
each firm, and 3.6 earnings forecasts for each actual earnings event. We have a maximum 
of 86 quarterly earnings reports for each firm and up to 225 earnings forecasts relating to 
each actual report. 
  Given that we wish to trace the dynamics of information flows from reported 
earnings to earnings forecasts (and vice-versa), we give special attention to the timing of 
forecasts, relative to when the relevant quarter ended and when the associated earnings 
report was actually issued. The average lag between the timing of the earnings report due 
date and when it was issued was 33.2 days. While most forecasts for any given quarter 
were made during that quarter, some were made prior to the beginning of the quarter in 
question, and many were made after the end of the quarter but before the earnings report 
was actually issued. As such, we characterize our sample of earnings forecasts into three 
mutually exclusive groups: Type 1 forecasts are forecasts which occur prior to the release 
of reported earnings for the previous quarter; Type 2 forecasts are forecasts that occur 
within the quarter in question, but post Type 1 forecasts; while Type 3 forecasts are those 
that come after the end of the quarter, but prior to the actual reported earnings event.
13  
Figure 1 provides a pictorial representation of the three different types of forecasts. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
  Figure 2 shows the distribution of earnings forecasts for Marsh and McClennan 
during the first quarter of 1985, as an illustrative example of a typical situation in our 
                                                 
13 The timing of Type 3 forecasts corresponds to the period designated for earnings “preannouncements” i.e. 
management forecasts made after the end of the reporting period, but before the release of the preliminary 
final earnings announcement. For examples of this literature, see Skinner (1994); Soffer, Thiagarajan and 
Walther (2000); and Skinner and Sloan (2002). Other things being equal, Type 3 forecasts are ‘information 
rich’ as they occur in a time period in which management are most active in providing guidance to the 
analysts since the quarter is over and the management will have proprietary information about quarterly 
performance.  Management may resort to preannouncements to manage the analysts so as to avoid any 
possible earnings disappointments (Matsumoto, 2002).   17 
sample.
14 In this case there were a total of nine forecasts. Two Type 1 forecasts were 
made before the release (on January 31 1985) of the report for the fourth quarter 1984 
earnings, five Type 2 forecasts were made between the release of the fourth quarter report 
and the end of the first quarter of 1985, two Type 3 forecasts (both of same value) were 
made between the end of the first quarter 1985 and the release of the corresponding report 
on April 30 1985, and one Type 4 forecast was made after the release of the report.
15  
[Figure 2 about here] 
We treat each of these types of forecasts differently, because each is associated with 
a different information setting. The earliest (Type 1) forecasts (labelled as section ‘T1’ in 
the figure) do not have the benefit of the information contained in the 1984:4 earnings 
that were announced on January 31 1985. Type 2 forecasts (in the section labelled ‘T2’) 
incorporate the information in the announced 1984:4 earnings, but occur prior to the 
quarter’s end. Type 3 forecasts (in the section labelled ‘T3’) incorporate the information 
in the Type 1 and Type 2 forecasts, as well as all information that has come to hand before 
the end of 1985:1. 
  Of the 19,983 firms in our original sample, there were one hundred and twenty two 
for which we had a continuous series of at least 60 actual reported earnings observations, 
and we restricted our time series analysis to these firms. Over the period of analysis, our 
sample firms have market capitalization ranging from US$15 million to US$596 billion 
dollars (Microsoft Corp).  The median (average) market capitalization of the sample was 
US$2.9 billion (US$12.1 billion).  The sample covers 35 two-digit SIC industries with no 
                                                 
14Marsh and McClennan is a professional services firm providing consulting advice in the areas of risk, 
strategy and human capital. The firm belongs to the GICS financial services sector. 
15 Type 4 forecasts can potentially incorporate all relevant information, including the announced earnings. 
However, since reported earnings are known, these are not valid forecasts in the normal sense of the word – 
thus we ignore them for the purposes of our analysis.    18 
more than ten percent of the sample drawn from the two main industries, Electronic and 
other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment (SIC 36) and 
Electric, gas, and sanitary services (SIC 49). 
Summary details of the reported earnings and associated forecasts for these firms 
are displayed in Table 2. Our final sample contains 9,078 observations and 126,202 
forecasts. Most (80.1%) of these forecasts are of the Type 2 variety – they are issued after 
the last earnings announcement, but before the end of the current reporting quarter. An 
additional 17.4% are of the Type 3 variety – they are forecasts issued after the quarter has 
ended but before the earnings report is actually made public. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2  Are analyst forecasts unbiased? 
The lower half of Table 2 contains some statistics relating to the accuracy of the 
forecasts. Overall, there is a statistically significant positive bias in the forecasts, 
consistent with analyst optimism, particularly with respect to Type 1 forecasts, which are 
made well in advance of the released earnings report. Interestingly, the forecasts made 
after the end of the reporting quarter are negatively biased, implying a small positive 
earnings surprise once the earnings are actually announced. This switch from analysts’ 
optimism to pessimism over time is not surprising. Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004, 
p. 885) called this the “earnings-guidance game” where ‘analysts first issue optimistic 
earnings forecasts and then “walk down” their estimates to a level that firms can beat at 
the official earnings announcement’. Initially, analysts are keen to develop a positive 
relationship with management and thus early earnings forecasts tend to be optimistic. It is   19 
likely that as management takes a more active role to manage the analysts’ expectations 
just before the earnings announcement through preannouncements, we would expect 
more analysts’ pessimism (Lennox and Park, 2006; Richarson, Teoh and Wysocki; 2004; 
Matsumoto, 2002).  
The bottom portion of Table 2 shows the correlations between the absolute value of 
the forecast errors and the time (in days) until the earnings for the target quarter are 
actually announced. Here, the correlation is strongest for Type 3 forecasts, consistent with 
forecast errors being smaller (in absolute magnitude) as the forecast horizon becomes 
smaller. It is interesting to note that Type 1 forecasts occur so far in advance of the 
release of announced earnings that the associated forecast errors have no significant 
correlation with the forecast horizon.  This finding is consistent with the error 
convergence property of analyst forecasts over time and one of the major explanations for 
this convergence property is the enlargement of the information set as the firm 
approaches its earnings announcement date. 
  An across the board regression of reported earnings on analysts’ forecasts produces 
the following outcome:  
 
2 ˆ 0.0008 0.9851 126202. 0.864
( 0.217) (100.6)
tt ef w i t h a n d N R =− + = =
−
 
The figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation covariance corrected 
(HAC) t-statistics, and separate tests of the null hypotheses that the intercept is zero 
( 0 0 β = ) and the slope coefficient is unity ( 1 1 β = ) have p-values of 0.8358 and 0.1285, 
respectively. Thus the forecasts initially appear to be unbiased, although a joint test of   20 
these hypotheses contradicts this conclusion, having a p-value of 0.0012.
16 Repeating this 
regression for each of the 122 firms, leads to 45 rejections of the null hypotheses 
that 0 0 β = , 45 rejections of the null that 1 1 β = , and 75 rejections of the joint null. This 
shows that although forecasts are unbiased for about 40% of the firms in our sample, 
there is evidence of bias in the remaining 60%. 
An across the board regression of earnings on the three forecast types (with the 
three types of forecasts being dummied using  1t d ,  2t d  and  3t d ) produces the following 
outcome: 
123 1 2 1 3 , ˆ 0.011 0.002 0.006 0.896 0.981 1.011
( 0.99) ( 0.05) ( 0.12) (21.84) (92.34) (97.74)
t ttt t t t t t t e ddd d f d f d f =− − − + + +
−− −
 
As above, the brackets contain HAC t-statistics. In this case, the null hypothesis that the 
three forecast types are equally as accurate is soundly rejected.  The null hypothesis that 
forecasts are jointly unbiased is soundly rejected, as are the null hypotheses that the Type 
1 and Type 2 forecasts are unbiased. However, the data accepts the restriction that the 
Type 3 forecasts are unbiased, with the p-value for the relevant test being 0.1775.
17 
 
3.3 Organising the analyst forecasts  
The broad research questions of interest are whether analysts' earnings forecasts represent 
useful substitutes or complements to actual reported earnings, and what sort of lead-lag 
structures characterize the relationship between the earnings forecasts and the reported 
earnings. In particular we are interested in whether there is information in the earnings 
forecasts (reported earnings) that is useful for predicting reported earnings (earnings 
                                                 
16 We address the issue of how the presence of unit roots might affect inference when we present time 
series regressions of earnings on forecasts. 
17 Details are not reported to conserve space.   21 
forecasts), and whether the earnings forecasts (reported earnings) contain information that 
is not contained in past reported earnings (earnings forecasts). A time series technique 
often used to address issues such as these is the Granger causality test. However, this test 
is typically based on regularly observed data, with each series being observed (just once) 
during each time period. In the current setting however, we have to deal with the fact that 
there may be many forecasts for each earnings observation, and that forecasts and 
earnings are not observed contemporaneously. 
   We appeal to the forecast combination literature to address the first of these issues 
(see Timmermann, 2006), and work with "combined" or consensus forecasts for each 
quarter. There are many ways of combining forecasts and while there is an ongoing 
debate regarding which combinations are optimal, it is widely recognized that arithmetic 
averages work well in many situations. Indeed, arithmetic averages are often superior (in 
terms of root mean squared error) to trimmed averages or averages that have been 
weighted according to criteria such as the relative timing of forecasts. This leads us to 
choose unweighted forecast averages for each quarter as our representative measure.  
  However, we do allow for the forecast timing considerations alluded to above by 
considering three forecast combinations. First, using  2t d as an indicator taking a value of 
unity when fjtτ is a Type 2 forecast and zero otherwise, we focus on  2t f defined below, as 
our primary forecast variable: 












τ         ( 1 )  
This forecast metric takes the arithmetic average of Type 2 forecasts, across analysts for a 
given firm, in a specific quarter. Type 2 forecasts are "standard" forecasts, in the sense   22 
that while they might incorporate past earnings information, they do not incorporate any 
information that becomes available after the end of the reporting period.  
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τ        ( 4 )  
for comparison and robustness checks. In the first case,  12t d  picks out Type 1 or Type 2 
forecasts,  23t d  picks out Type 2 or Type 3 forecasts, while  123t d  picks out forecasts of 
Type 1, Type 2 or Type 3. Each metric is the arithmetic average for the designated 
forecast types, across analysts for a given firm, in a specific quarter.
18  
  Figure 3 compares the three forecast combinations for an illustrative sample firm, 
Eli Lilly.
19 We find that there is very little difference between them, and since the naked 
eye cannot differentiate them from each other when they are plotted in the same graph, 
we have added constants to each of f12 and f123 to illustrate their co-movement. Figure 4 
compares the combination f2 forecast with the reported earnings series for the same 
illustrative firm. The forecasts track the reported earnings quite closely, although not 
surprisingly they fail to capture the sharp decline in earnings in 1987:4. In this case we 
can attribute the forecast error to analysts' inability to anticipate the corporate earnings 
                                                 
18 We did not calculate forecast averages for Type 1 or Type 3 forecasts alone because on several occasions 
the set of forecasts relating to any given reported earnings observation did not include any of these types of 
forecasts. 
19 Eli Lilly, established in the 1870s, is a leading producer of prescription drugs. Accordingly, it belongs to 
the Healthcare GICS sector, and is classified in the pharmaceuticals sub-industry.   23 
impact of the 1987 stock market crash. Such ‘failures’ were observed for several (but not 
all) firms for this quarter, and similarly large forecast errors were observed once or twice 
at other times across most of the sample.  
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
Table 3 reports the time series properties of earnings and forecast combinations. It 
shows that for most of the 122 firms in our sample, there is a quarterly seasonality in the 
data series and evidence of a trend. Much of this trend is likely to be drift associated with 
a unit root process in earnings, because the unit root tests reported in column 7 reject the 
null of a unit root in only twenty two cases.  Data that contains a unit root with drift is 
“non-stationary” in the sense that even if it is de-trended, the de-trended data fails to be 
mean reverting, so that the series “wanders” rather than returns to trend. The variance is 
also non-constant, growing with the sample size. These properties can imply that standard 
t and F tests statistics do not have the usual t and F distributions, so that care is needed 
when attempting to draw inferences based on the usual types of tests. We deal with this 
problem in the formal analysis that follows. The properties of the forecasts mirror those 
for earnings, although there are differences between the incidence of outliers in the 
earnings series and the incidence of outlying forecasts.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 provides some preliminary analysis of the relationship between reported 
earnings and earnings forecast combinations. The usual tests of "good forecasting" are 
provided in column 3 and 4, although it needs to be noted that the time series behavior of 
our raw data is likely to invalidate many of these tests. Nevertheless, if we treat these test 
results as "indicative", then we find evidence against the assertion that et = ft + a zero   24 
mean prediction error, for about thirty out of the 122 firms. Given that earnings and 
forecasts appear to contain unit roots, an appropriate way to analyse the relationship 
between them is to consider whether they are cointegrated. Series with unit roots are 
often called integrated series in the time series literature, and two integrated series are 
cointegrated if they move together in the long run, even though each series tends to 
“wander” when considered individually. The idea that there might be a close long-run 
relation between earning and forecasts is intuitively appealing, and it is actually expected 
in a forecasting context.
20  In column 5, tests of no cointegration support cointegration in 
most cases, and if we force the cointegrating vector to reflect a one-to-one relationship 
between earnings and forecasts, then the tests (in column 6) broadly support this 
restriction.
21  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
4. Tests of Granger Causality – Modified to Account for Irregular Observations 
4.1 Standard Granger causality tests 
Given two series xt and yt, standard Granger Causality tests (Granger, 1969) are based on 
the bivariate system given by: 
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20 Campbell and Shiller (1988) discuss this issue in the context of forecasting dividends.  This is also 
consistent with the notion that analysts have the ability to forecast the permanent component of earnings of 
a firm relatively accurately. 
21 Formally, the tests are performed using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) approach. In this case, the 
rejection of a unit root supports cointegration and a long run relationship between earnings and forecasts.   25 
and a test that Xt does not Granger cause Yt (i.e. H0 :Xt ↛ Yt) is an F-test of H0: all γj = 0, 
while a test that Yt does not Granger cause Xt is an F-test of H0: all βj = 0. Granger is 
careful to emphasize that a rejection of H0: Xt ↛ Yt does not mean that Xt might cause Yt 
in any physical sense; rather, he stresses the forecasting implication that the history of Xt 
(i.e.  {} t t t
H
t x x x X ,... , 2 1 − − =   must contain information that is not contained in 
{} t t t
H
t y y y Y ,... , 2 1 − − = , and that this additional information is useful for predicting yt. 
Similarly, a rejection of H0: Yt ↛ Xt simply means that 
H
t Y  contains information (not in 
H
t X ) that is useful for predicting xt. Practical considerations in conducting these tests 
include the choice of the lag length p (conventionally achieved using information criteria 
such as AIC), and checking that xt and yt do not have properties (such as unit roots) that 
might cause the distribution of the test statistic to be non-standard (i.e. not an F 
distribution). 
  The latter problem can be circumvented by using an approach outlined in Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) or by considering an error correction approach. Toda and Yamamoto’s 
procedure simply adds an extra lag onto (5), but conducts the tests on lags 1 – p. Standard 
t and F tests are valid once the extra lag has been included in the test regression. The 
second and more common approach is based on the well known error correction re-
parameterization of (5) given by: 
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1 1    26 
where  λx = ∑αj – 1, πx = ∑βj/λx, and the 
* *, j j β α fill out the remaining lag structure. 
Equation (6) is obtained from (5) by subtracting  11 (, ) ' tt xy −−   from each side of the 
equation and rearranging terms. In equation (6), πx measures the long-run impact of yt on 
xt , and πy (=1/πx) measures the long-run impact of xt on yt. If xt and yt are cointegrated 
then a cointegrating relationship is given by xt = πxyt and at least one of λx or λy will be 
non-zero, but (6) is a valid representation of (5) even if xt and yt are not cointegrated. 
Tests based on the equations in (6) are well behaved because the variables in these 
equations are typically stationary. Exceptions occur when there is no long-run 
relationship between xt and yt, so that xt–1 – πxyt–1 is non-stationary. In this case OLS will 
force  x λ ˆ  and  y λ ˆ to zero so as to minimize the sum of squared residuals, but the remaining 
parameter estimates are well behaved.  
  Three types of Granger causality tests are typically considered in this framework: 
(i) a test of long-run Granger causality (LRC); (ii) a test of short-run Granger causality 
(SRC) and (iii) an overall test of Granger causality (GC). Considering tests that yt does 
not Granger cause xt, the long-run test is a (t or F) test of H₀: λx = 0; the short-run test is a 
test (F-test) of H₀: all βj* = 0, and the overall test is a joint test of both of these 
hypotheses. The mirror images of these tests apply for the converse case of the null that xt 
does not Granger cause yt. 
 
4.2 Modified Granger causality tests 
Our time series for reported earnings and their forecasts do not fully conform with the 
above framework, because our forecasts ft are measured before the earnings et  are 
observed. Further, we are interested in whether {ft , ft-1, ft-2, …f1} contains information   27 
about et, over and above the information in {et-1, et-2, …e1}, whereas a standard Granger 
causality analysis asks whether { ft-1, ft-2, …f1} contains information about et, over and 
above the information in {et-1, et-2, …e1}. That is, in our framework ft is validly included 
as part of the information set for  t e , whereas it would not be included in conventional 
settings. We are also interested in whether the history of earnings provides information 
(not in past forecasts) that feeds into current forecasts, i.e. whether {et-1, et-2, …e1} 
contributes to forecasts ft, given that {ft-1, ft-2, …f1} is known. This leads us to consider the 
system specified by: 
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and its error correction parameterization given by 
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where we have normalized the error correction terms on et (and rescaled λf accordingly). 
Tests of whether earnings forecasts lead reported earnings in the long run are based on λe, 
tests of whether forecasts lead earnings in the short run are based on the βj
*, and overall 
tests of whether forecasts lead earnings are joint tests on λe and βj
*. Similarly, tests of 
whether past reported earnings provide information about current forecasts that is not 
contained in past forecasts, are tests relating to 
*
f λ  and/or γj
*.    28 
  We call our tests Granger causality tests, but emphasize that they have a subtly 
different format and interpretation than standard Granger causality tests. In our empirical 
implementation, we choose the lag length p by applying AIC to the joint system defined 
in (7). AIC is useful in this context, because it tends to choose long lag lengths, which 
then increases the likelihood that our models incorporate all relevant dynamics (that are 
needed for forecasting) and reduces the possibility of serial correlation in the residuals. 
We augment our chosen lag length for (7) by one lag so that we can use the Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) results and have confidence in our inferences. We also include 
quarterly dummies in (7) and (8) to account for the seasonality reported in Table 3, and 
we include a time trend in (7) to account for possible drift.  When estimating the 
equations in (8) we use a two-stage approach in which we first estimate the "error 
correction term" or deviation from the long term relationship (i.e. zt = et – πxft), and then 
use the implied zt-1 and single equation OLS to estimate our "causality" coefficients. We 
experiment with two estimates of zt; the first (zt
1) works with the residuals obtained by 
running a regression of et on ft (and a constant), while the second is the "theoretical 
deviation", defined by zt
2 = et –ft. We base all of our causality analysis on HAC corrected 
F-tests.  
 
5.   Empirical Results 
Table 5 presents summary information relating to our estimates of the equations in (7) for 
each of the 122 firms. Reported regressions are based on: (a) Type 2 forecasts (i.e. we set 
ft = f2t); (b) combined Type 1 & 2 forecasts in which ft = f12t; (c) combined Type 2 & 3 
forecasts in which ft = f23t; and (d) all types of forecasts in which ft = f123t.  All test   29 
statistics are based on Toda and Yamamoto’s approach so that inference is valid despite 
possible non-stationarity, and they are also corrected for residual heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation. 
          The first thing to note is that the estimated equations fit the data very well, with the 
average R² measures being around 90%. In columns 3 and 5 we present the results of 
"Granger causality" tests based on the β and γ coefficients, to provide an indication of the 
causality structure in the data. The reported counts suggest that past forecasts are useful 
for predicting current earnings in all but seventeen (three) firms for Type 2 forecasts (all 
types of forecasts). Here, the tests are conditioned on past earnings, so that the Granger 
causality indicates that past forecasts are providing additional information on future 
earnings to that contained in past earnings. There are not pronounced differences between 
the results found for different types of forecasts, but it seems that the later the forecasts, 
the more likely they are to be useful for predicting earnings. Column 5 indicates that 
analysts often incorporate information from past earnings into their forecasts, even after 
using information contained in past forecasts. Indeed, for Type 2 (Type 1 & 2) forecasts, 
there are only twenty nine (twenty eight) cases in which analysts do not seem to be using 
information on past earnings when forming their forecasts. By comparison, for all types 
of forecasts, the number of cases in which analysts do not seem to be using information 
on past earnings has grown to thirty five.  
          Details on the chosen lag structure for these models are not reported, but our results 
show that although the persistence in earnings and forecasts varies quite widely from firm 
to firm, it is generally long-lived. Past information takes three years (12 quarters) to be 
fully reflected in current data in more than one third of our firms. This is particularly   30 
noteworthy given that the previous accounting literature has found or assumed much 
shorter persistence in earnings, but it is quite consistent with Ou and Penmen’s (1989) 
notion of a permanent component in earnings.  Indeed, this finding of a long-lived 
persistence in earnings/forecasts is a major contribution of our paper as most studies only 
provide an understanding of the lead-lag relationship between reported earnings and stock 
prices (Ou and Penman; 1989 and Beaver, Lambert and Morse; 1980).
22 
 [Table 5 about here] 
Tables 6 and 7 present details relating to estimated versions of the re-parameterized 
system (8). In both tables, each of the two error correction models lead to very similar 
outcomes and it is noteworthy that the overall tests of no Granger causality in Tables 6 
and 7 are also similar to those in Table 5. For the first differences in reported earnings 
equations in Table 6, the results for the estimated error correction term suggest a long-run 
effect of Type 2 (all types) forecasts in fifty eight (sixty nine) cases.
23 The estimated λe 
coefficient while not reported, is usually negative for every firm. From this we can infer 
that on average, changes in reported earnings will fall when previous forecasts were too 
low (et-1 – ft-1 >0) and they will rise (on average) when past forecasts were too high. First 
differences in earnings forecasts also have short-run predictive power for quarterly 
changes in reported earnings. For Type 2 (all types) forecasts, the results suggest a short-
run effect for one hundred and eight (one hundred and twenty) cases. The error correction 
models that impose unbiased forecasts lead to slightly stronger results, finding more 
evidence of causality than in the unrestricted case.  
 [Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
                                                 
22 See Nichols and Wahlen (2004) for a review of the accounting research on the relationship between 
earnings numbers and stock returns. 
23 We find similar results for the case in which there is imposed error correction term.   31 
For the quarterly changes in earnings forecasts shown in Table 7, we see less 
evidence of both long and short-run causality, although it is still clear that past earnings 
generally contain information that appears to influence forecasts. Announcements appear 
to contain useful long-run information about forecasts. As was the case for Table 6, the 
results of the imposed error correction term set-up are generally stronger than the 
counterpart estimated error correction term results. For example, in the imposed situation 
with Type 2 forecasts, there is a long-run causality effect in fifty four cases, compared to 
thirty seven when the error correction term is estimated (Table 7, columns (3) and (7)). 
For cases when the estimated 
*
f λ   is statistically significant, it is generally positive, 
reflecting future upward adjustment of forecasts when past earnings were higher than 
predicted (et-1 – ft-1 >0).  
  Finally, the results of short-run causality are stronger than for the long run. For 
example, an examination of the imposed error correction term results show that for 
seventy two cases for the Type 2 forecasts there is evidence of short-run causality, 
whereas only fifty four counterpart cases of long-run causality are found (Table 7, 
columns (7) and (8)). This suggests that analysts often find recent past earnings reports 
useful when forming their forecasts, but they are less likely to find the entire history of 
past earnings useful when forming these forecasts. This is a central finding in our paper 
as it is the first time substantial empirical evidence is provided to support this intuitive 
conclusion in a time series framework. 
       Tables 8 and 9 provide an overview of the results of the tests. Using the framework 
outlined in Table 1 (Categories C1 to C4), generally, these tables show that there is bi-
directional causality (C1) for about 75% of firms (using both the estimated and implied   32 
error correction terms). Most of this causality is of the short-run variety (Table 8, Panel 
D: 58.2%; Table 9, Panel D: 60.7%), rather than long-run (Table 8, Panel D: 18.0%; 
Table 9, Panel D: 21.3%). For short-term and overall Granger causality, there are only 
very few cases where neither earnings nor forecasts influence each other. The tables 
present compelling evidence that forecasts can predict earnings, but they also show that 
earnings provide information that is utilized in subsequent forecasts. This suggests that 
forecasts complement, rather than substitute for earnings reports. 
[Tables 8 and 9 about here] 
Two important observations are gleaned from Tables 8 and 9.  First, cases of bi-
directional and uni-directional Granger causality are much more prevalent in the short-
run as compared to the long-run.  Second, it is heartening to observe that earnings 
forecasts Granger cause reported earnings in considerably more cases than reported 
earnings Granger cause forecast earnings.  This clearly shows the important role played 
by earnings forecasts in capturing the information content of reported earnings and, 
hence, the important role played by analysts in providing information to the market about 
the reported earnings of firms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We conduct suitably adapted Granger causality tests to study information flows between 
analyst earnings forecasts and reported earnings. This time-series methodology 
complements the standard cross-sectional techniques that are often based on stock market 
reactions to the arrival of news, by enabling analysis on the lead-lag structure of the 
information content in forecasts and reports. We reconfirm previous evidence of a   33 
positive bias in forecasts, but also find that this evidence becomes weaker as the forecast 
horizon becomes shorter. Further, we find that the lag structure in information flows is 
longer (up to twelve quarters) than has been assumed in previous literature. 
  Our Granger causality tests find that analysts’ earnings forecasts Granger-cause 
reported earnings in the short run for nearly all firms. Furthermore, analysts earnings 
forecasts Granger-cause reported earnings in the long run for about half of all firms. This 
provides time series evidence that forecasts are useful for predicting future earnings 
despite forecast bias. In both cases, the Granger causality implies that the forecasts 
contain information over and above that which is contained in past earnings alone.  
         We also find that earnings Granger-cause forecasts for about two thirds of the firms 
in the short run and for about one third of the firms in the long run. Taken together, our 
test results demonstrate that there is pervasive bi-directional causality, even though we 
document stronger forecast to reporting earnings Granger causality than causality in the 
reverse direction. However, this latter type of causality is particularly interesting, because 
it implies that future forecasts are not simply based on previous forecasts; they rely on 
additional information contained in earnings reports as well. Thus we conclude that 
forecasts do not (fully) substitute for the reported earnings figures, but rather, they 
complement the information contained in reported earnings. 
           Our time series approach offers a new perspective on how analyst forecasts and 
earnings reports contribute to the information set on a firm’s performance, because it 
explicitly accounts for the timing of information events. Further, our approach allows for 
(non constant) firm specific differences in behavior, since we have not averaged across 
different firms (as in standard cross-sectional analysis, or in standard analyses of panels).   34 
Our summary results show that the causality results differ across firms especially in the 
long-run, and especially when one considers the impact of past earnings reports on 
forecasts. Our future research will focus on the determination of firm and analyst 
characteristics that have an influence on whether earnings do (or do not) Granger cause 
forecasts (and whether forecasts do, or do not Granger cause earnings).  
   35 
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Earnings Forecasts (f) Granger 
Cause Reported Earnings (e) 
Earnings Forecasts (f) do not Granger 
Cause Reported Earnings (e) 
Reported Earnings (e) Granger 
Cause Earnings Forecasts (f) 
C1: Bi-directional causality 
 
 
C2: Uni-directional causality 
 
 
Reported Earnings (e) do not 
Granger Cause Earnings 
Forecasts (f) 
C3: Uni-directional causality 
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Table 2: Properties of Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
 
Type of Earnings Forecast   Properties All  Forecasts 
Type  1 Type  2 Type  3 
Total Count  126,202  3,087  101,112  22,003 
mean forecast error (f − e)    0.0068*** 0.0460*** 0.0080***  -0.0041* 
HAC. standard error (f − e)  0.0019 0.0091 0.0019 0.0025 
corr ( |f − e| , (s − τ) )   0.0358***  -0.0022  0.0253***  0.0832*** 
HAC. standard error (corr)   0.0028  0.0180  0.0031  0.0067 
Notes: 
The symbols *** and * signify statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. The quantity (s − 
τ ) measures the time between when the earnings forecast (f) was made and when the reported earnings (e) was 
issued. HAC standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Forecasts (f) are separated 
into three types according to their timing relative to the quarter to which they relate. Type 1 forecasts occur 
prior to the release of reported earnings for the previous quarter; Type 2 forecasts occur during the quarter, but 
post Type 1 forecasts; and Type 3 forecasts occur after the end of the ‘target’ quarter but before the reporting 






Table 3: Properties of Time series for Reported Earnings and Earnings Forecast 
Combinations 
 
Earnings /     No. of Outliers  Number of Rejections (at 5% level) 
Forecast Type  Ave R
2 <  6se >  6se H 0: α0 = 0  H0: α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 H 0: unit root 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Earnings  0.5156 27  10  92  82  22 
Forecasts           
Type 2   0.4993 40  2  85  81  33 
Type 1 & Type 2   0.5322 17  4  86  82  26 
Type 2 & Type 3   0.5168 27  1  89  82  30 
All Forecasts   0.5593 6  2  91  84  21 
Notes: 
Time series properties reported in this table relate to a sample of 122 firms. All columns except the last 
relate to the regression: yt = α0t + α1q1 + α2q2 + α3q3 + α4q4 + ut, where yt is the series of interest, t is a time 
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Table 4: Relationship between Reported Earnings and Earnings Forecast Combinations 
 




2   H 0: β1 = 1    H0: β0 = 0 & β1 = 1    et –β1ft   et – ft 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Type 2  0.7118  29  31  87  100 
Type 1 & Type 2   0.7607 26  31  91  98 
Type 2 & Type 3   0.7714 28  30  94 100 
All Types  0.8346  23  29  98  98 
Notes: 
The information reported in this table relate to a sample of 122 firms. All columns except the last relate 
to the regression: et = β0 + β1 ft + ut, where et is reported earnings and ft is the earnings forecast. See 





Table 5: Predictability of Reported Earnings and Earnings Forecasts 
 
Equation for Earnings  Equation for Forecasts   
 
Forecast Type   
Ave R
2 
Rejections of H0: f does not 




Rejections of H0: e does not 
Granger Cause f (5 % level) 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Type 2  0.9132  105  0.8883  93 
Type 1 & Type 2  0.9118  108  0.9045  94 
Type 2 & Type 3  0.9384  116  0.9067  90 
All Types  0.9391  119  0.9300  87 
Notes: 
The information reported in this table relate to a sample of 122 firms. Lag lengths p were chosen using AIC 
for each bivariate system and then augmented by one. The earnings and forecasting equations are specified in 
equation (7) in the text, but they include quarterly dummies and a time trend as well. H0: f does not Granger 
Cause e implies that all βj = 0 (except for the augmented lag) and H0: e does not Granger Cause f implies that 
all  γj = 0 (except for the augmented lag). All test statistics have been calculated using HAC consistent 
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Table 6: Predictability of First Differences in Reported Earnings (e) – Do Earnings Forecasts (f) 
Granger Cause Reported Earnings (e)? 
 
Estimated Error Correction Term  Imposed Error Correction Term 






2  No LRC  No SRC  No GC 
 
Ave R
2  No LRC  No SRC  No GC 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Type 2   0.8294  58  108 112  0.8327  64  109 109 
Type 1 & Type 2   0.8388  61  113 116  0.8406  64  113 114 
Type 2 & Type 3   0.8669  65  115 116  0.8707  70  116 116 
All  Types  0.8834  69  120 120  0.8857  70  120 120 
 
Notes: 
The information reported in this table relate to a sample of 122 firms. Lag lengths p were chosen using AIC for 
each bivariate system. The earnings equation is the first of the two in equation (8) in the text, but it includes 
quarterly dummies as well. For the columns labelled “Estimated Error Correction Term” we replace the (et–1 – 
πxft–1) term by z
1
1 − t , and for the columns labelled “Imposed Error Correction Term” we replace the (et–1 – πxft–1) 
term by z
2
1 − t . See the text for definitions of z
1
t  and z
2
t . LRC stands for long-run Granger causality; SRC stands for 
short-run Granger causality and GC stands for overall (short-run and long-run) Granger causality. The test of H0: 
no LRC implies λe = 0, the test of H0: no SRC implies all 
*
j β = 0 and the test of H0: no GC implies λe = 0 and all 
*
j β  = 0. All test statistics have been calculated using HAC consistent covariances. See Table 2 for a description of 
the forecast types. 
 
 
Table 7: Predictability of First Differences in Earnings Forecasts – Do Reported Earnings (e) 
Granger Cause Earnings Forecasts (f)? 
 
Estimated Error Correction Term  Imposed Error Correction Term 






2  No LRC  No SRC  No GC 
 
Ave R
2 No  LRC No  SRC No  GC 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Type 2  0.7335  37  76  93  0.7476  54  72  101 
Type 1 & Type 2   0.7442 39  74  91  0.7507 48  75  96 
Type 2 & Type 3   0.7442 38  72  92  0.7474 41  70  95 
All Types  0.7522  40  72  93  0.7486  40  75  93 
Notes: 
The information reported in this table relate to a sample of 122 firms. Lag lengths p were chosen using AIC for 
each bivariate system. The forecast equation is the second of the two in equation (8) in the text, but it includes 
quarterly dummies as well. For the columns labelled “Estimated Error Correction Term” we replace the (et–1 – 
πxft–1) term by z
1
1 − t , and for the columns labelled “Imposed Error Correction Term” we replace the (et–1 – πxft–1) 
term by z
2
1 − t . See the text for definitions of z
1
t  and z
2
t . LRC stands for long-run Granger causality; SRC stands 
for short-run Granger causality and GC stands for overall (short-run and long-run) Granger causality. The test 
of H0: no LRC implies 
*
f λ =0 the test of H0: no SRC implies all 
*
j γ = 0 and the test of H0: no GC implies  *
f λ  = 
0 and all 
*
j γ  = 0. All test statistics have been calculated using HAC consistent covariances. See Table 2 for a 
description of the forecast types. 42 
 
Table 8: Joint Outcomes of Granger Causality Testing for the case in which an Estimated Error Cor
 
  Short-run Granger Causality (SRC)  Long-run Granger Causality (LRC)  Ov
  f “causes” e  f does not “cause” e  f  “causes” e  f does not “cause” e  f  “ca
Panel A: Type 2 Forecasts        
e “causes” f  71   (58.2%)  5   (4.1%)  16   (13.1%)  21   (17.2%)  85   (
e does not “cause” f  37   (30.3%)  9   (7.4%)  42   (34.4%)  43   (35.2%)  27   (
Panel B: Type 1 & Type 2 Forecasts         
e “causes” f  72   (59.0%)  2   (1.6%)  19   (15.6%)  20   (16.4%)  87   (
e does not “cause” f  41   (33.6%)  7   (5.7%)  42   (34.4%)  41   (33.6%)  29   (
Panel C: Type 2 & Type 3 Forecasts         
e “causes” f  70   (57.4%)  2   (1.6%)  19   (15.6%)  19   (15.6%)  87   (
e does not “cause” f  45   (36.9%)  5   (4.1%)  46   (37.7%)  38   (31.1%)  29   (
Panel D: All type Forecasts         
e “causes” f  71   (58.2%)  1   (0.8%)  22   (18.0%)  18   (14.8%)  92   (
e does not “cause” f  49   (40.2%)  1   (0.8%)  47   (38.5%)  35   (28.7%)  28   (
 
Notes: 
After conducting formal tests against H1 and H2, we use the results from Tables 6 and 7 to classify each firm into one of four 
Table 1. The information reported in this table relate to a sample of 122 firms, for the case in which an estimated error correctio
forecasts are separated into three types according to their timing relative to the quarter to which they relate. Type 1 forecasts oc
reported earnings for the previous quarter; Type 2 forecasts occur during the quarter, but post Type 1 forecasts; and Type 3 fore
of the ‘target’ quarter but before the reporting date of the earnings.     43 
Table 9: Joint Outcomes of Granger Causality Testing for the case in which an Imposed Error Corre
 
  Short-run Granger Causality (SRC)  Long-run Granger Causality (LRC)  Ov
  f “causes” e  f does not “cause” e  f  “causes” e  f does not “cause” e  f  “ca
Panel A: Type 2 Forecasts       
e “causes” f  68   (55.7%)  4   (3.3%)  28   (23.0%)  26   (21.3%)  88   (
e does not “cause” f  41   (33.6%)  9   (7.4%)  36   (29.5%)  32   (26.2%)  21   (
Panel B: Type 1 & Type 2 Forecasts       
e “causes” f  73   (59.8%)  2   (1.6%)  24   (19.7%)  24   (19.7%)  89   (
e does not “cause” f  40   (32.8%)  7   (5.7%)  40   (32.8%)  34   (27.9%)  25   (
Panel C: Type 2 & Type 3 Forecasts       
e “causes” f  68   (55.7%)  2   (1.6%)  22   (18.0%)  19   (15.6%)  89   (
e does not “cause” f  48   (39.3%)  4   (3.3%)  48   (39.3%)  33   (27.0%)  27   (
Panel D: All type Forecasts       
e “causes” f  74   (60.7%)  1   (0.8%)  26   (21.3%)  14   (11.5%)  92   (
e does not “cause” f  46   (37.7%)  1   (0.8%)  44   (36.1%)  38   (31.1%)  28   (
 
Notes: 
After conducting formal tests against H1 and H2, we use the results from Tables 6 and 7 to classify each firm into one of four 
Table 1. The information reported in this table relate to a sample of 122 firms, for the case in which an imposed error correctio
forecasts are separated into three types according to their timing relative to the quarter to which they relate. Type 1 forecasts oc
reported earnings for the previous quarter; Type 2 forecasts occur during the quarter, but post Type 1 forecasts; and Type 3 fore
of the ‘target’ quarter but before the reporting date of the earnings. 44 
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Figure 2: Forecasts for 1985 First Quarter Earnings 
Marsh and McClennan 








































Earnings report released (30 April 1985) 
End of quarter (31 March 1985) 
Last quarter earnings report released  (31 Jan 1985) 




Figure 3: Comparison of Forecast Combinations 





Figure 4: Comparison of Earnings and f2 Combination Forecasts 
(Eli Lilly Company) 